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Introduction 
 
While in the Westminster community of nations the ascend of political advisers is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, in others there is a long tradition of engaging ministerial cabinets, as the 
structural interfaces between politics and administration. Relatively large, ministerial cabinets 
consist of seconded civil servants and external political appointees who as an extension of their 
minister are in a superior position in relation to departmental senior civil servants. Ministerial 
cabinet advisers constantly put pressure on civil servants to ensure political responsiveness, while 
they are endowed with crucial policy-making roles and colonise all stages of the policy process 
(James 2007, OECD 2011).  
 
Research thus far has been particularly focused on the partitocratic and non-partitocratic functions 
and dysfunctions of the ministerial cabinet (Brans & Steen 2006, Carcassonne 1986, Di Mascio 
and Natalini 2013, Eraly 2001, Gaffney 1991, Göransson 2008, Quermonne 1994, Schrameck 
1995, Schreurs, Vandenabeele, Steen, & Brans 2010, Sotiropoulos 2007, Suleiman 1974, 
Walgrave, Caals, Suetens and De Swert 2004). Research with a specific focus on ministerial 
cabinet advisers has been much more limited (De Visscher et al 2015, Gouglas 2015, Gouglas et 
al. 2014, Pelgrims et al. 2008,  Vancoppenolle 2011). Given the centrality of the ministerial cabinet 
institution in the Napoleonic administrative tradition it is not a surprise that empirical studies have 
thus far focused primarily on the institution rather than the actors within it. On the one hand, 
ministerial cabinets form mini shadow administrations that control the public administration, serve 
as career pools and recruitment mechanisms for professional politicians and facilitate the 
promotion of befriended civil servants. On the other hand, they serve as communication and 
coordination mechanisms, brain trusts that address policy capacity deficits, sources of 
organisational flexibility and loyalty (Walgrave, Caals, Suetens and De Swert 2004, Brans & Steen 
2006, James 2007). Ministerial cabinets dominate the policy advisory system (PAS) in countries 
with a Napoleonic administrative tradition. Policy quality or the responsiveness of the 
administration to politics depends on the performance of the ministerial cabinets and their 
members. This is why the study of ministerial cabinet advisers is crucial. 
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The study of ministerial cabinet system advisers is important for a second reason too. With the 
exception of the US, which is the only example of a non-cabinet system where advisers directly 
manage other political appointees, as well as civil servants, we may be observing a process of 
“cabinetisation” in non-ministerial cabinet systems, which started in the 1980s and continues till 
today. Though neither uniform, nor equally intense, it may be argued that this process of 
“cabinetisation” consists of the following developments: a) increasing numbers of advisers, b) 
widening of the scope of advisers’ policy work, c) increased pressure towards the administration 
for political responsiveness, d) more blurred politico-administrative boundaries, e) increased use 
of advisers for coordination, f) increased public sector and citizen concern over advisers’ roles. In 
this respect the study of ministerial cabinet system advisers could enlighten other administrative 
and executive traditions that have been witnessing or dealing with such “cabinetisation” pressures. 
Seen under this light, research on ministerial cabinet system advisers can be argued to fall within 
both first wave (covering empirical gaps), as well as what Shaw and Eichbaum (2015) called 
second wave research on advisers (opting for new angles, concepts and approaches to the topic).  
 
In the present paper we do not deal with the concept of “cabinetisation”. Interesting as this might 
be, it is left as a suggestion for future research. Our present goal is to analyse ministerial cabinet 
advisers’ policy roles taking into account both substantive and dimensional considerations. We 
attempt to answer three fundamental questions:  
 
a) Do ministerial cabinet advisers colonise the policy process as previous studies of 
ministerial cabinets, the institutional habitat of advisers, suggest? 
b) Is there a dominant adviser type found within ministerial cabinets and if yes which one is 
it and how can it be explained? 
c) What are the dimensions (vertical and horizontal) of ministerial cabinet advisers’ work and 
is their work in every dimension a core institutional responsibility or an opportunity to be 
grabbed by those actors on an ad hoc basis? 
      
In order to answer our questions we use   
 
a) the policy cycles heuristic, as presented by Howlett et al (2009) 
b) the four adviser types, developed by Connaughton (2010a, 2010b, 2015) 
c) the three arenas, developed by Maley (2015) 
 
Our cases are Belgium, Greece and the European Commission. Belgium has a historical and closest 
to the ideal type ministerial cabinet system and is a consociational democracy. Greece has a much 
more recent ministerial cabinet system and is a majoritarian democracy. The European 
Commission cabinet system historically precedes Greece, but is a supranational organisation, at 
times referred to a sui generis polity. Data has been collected through questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews within three different research projects. The structure of the paper is as 
follows. The first section presents our theoretical framework and methods. The second section 
shortly introduces us into the context of the Belgian, Greek and European Commission cabinet 
systems. The third section addresses the question on adviser’s work at the various policy cycle 
stages. The fourth section classifies ministerial cabinet adviser types. The fifth section analyses 
advisers’ work on the three arenas. Finally, we summarize by critically discussing our findings.    
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1. Theory and Methods 
 
1.1 The Policy cycle 
 
Linking advisers’ activities to the policy cycle stages is a way to achieve a first systematic 
interpretation of their policy advice activity. Where in the cycle are they most active? The literature 
reveals that ministerial cabinets have a central role in the “design, formulation, implementation 
and evaluation of public policy” (James 2007, p. 17). We therefore hypothesize along similar lines. 
Ministerial cabinet advisers colonize all stages of the policy cycle. In the present paper, we use the 
five stages of the policy cycle presented by Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009): (i) agenda setting, 
(ii) policy formulation, (iii) decision making, (iv) policy implementation, and (v) policy 
evaluation. We measure advisers’ policy cycle location using data on frequency of time spent 
collected through a single question of a questionnaire survey. 
 
1.2 Types 
 
According to Connaughton (2010a, 2010b, 2015) there are four types of adviser: Type I is the 
expert, who is a specialist, politically passive, works on a specific policy field using knowledge, 
the impact of his work being expertise. Type II is the partisan who is responsive to the minister’s 
mission, highly political in all dimensions and closely associated with the minister, his impact 
being political dominance. Type III is the coordinator who is a generalist, politically variable 
(active or passive), provides oversight to the government program and acts as a fixer, his impact 
being management. Type IV is the minder who is a generalist but also responsive to the Minister. 
Unlike the Partisan who is a ‘party apparatchik’, the Minder is the minister’s bodyguard 
(Connaughton 2010a, p. 63) politically active, looking “for issues potentially harmful” to the 
political executive (Connaughton 2010b, p. 351-352). The impact of the minder is mutuality.  
 
Where do ministerial cabinet advisers stand in relation to the above typology? Are there any theory 
driven hypotheses we could make in advance? The literature on ministerial cabinets offers a series 
of conflicting hypotheses.   
 
H1: The dominant ministerial cabinet system adviser profile is that of the expert  
 
Using numbers of advisers and dominant adviser types, Schreurs et al (2010, p. 19 – 20) have 
grouped countries in three categories. In the first category we find countries where the dominant 
type is the Strategic Adviser (Type A), who is to be found in small numbers, and who is recruited 
on the basis of personal trust, having a role in strategy formulation and strategic steering. The UK 
is here a prime example. In the second category we find countries where the dominant type is the 
Media Advisor (Type B), who is also to be found in small numbers. However, the adviser here is 
usually an assistant performing various tasks including communications functions, having limited 
potential to steer strategic decisions. A typical case of Type B advisory arrangements is to be found 
(?) in the Netherlands. In the third category we find countries where the dominant type of adviser 
is the Expert (Type C). The expert provides for technical expertise and in contrast to the previous 
two categories, where the advisers are few in numbers, he or she is to be found in greater numbers 
within a ministerial cabinet. France and Belgium are here the most typical cases.  
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H2: The dominant ministerial cabinet adviser profile is that of the partisan working in an 
institution which performs crucial partitocratic functions 
 
Ministerial cabinets perform specific partitocratic functions, allowing for a firm hold of partisan 
politics on the administration (Walgrave et al 2004, p. 8). Advisers in this respect are expected to 
be highly politically active agents that sharpen the difference between politics and the 
administration.  
 
H3: Ministerial cabinet advisers are predominantly political policy managers who coordinate 
policy 
 
Recent empirical work on ministerial cabinet advisers in Greece (Gouglas 2015) and the European 
Commission (Gouglas, Brans, Chaslaridis 2014), which explicitly used Connaughton’s (2010a, 
2010b, 2015) four types, has pointed to advisers being primarily fixers who mend and monitor 
policy. Except for fixers advisers are also projected as politically aware agents who also care for 
protecting the political executive from potential harm.      
 
H4: There is no dominant adviser type, but a multitude of roles contingent upon system, nature of 
policy portfolio, and the attitudes of political executives 
 
The analysis of the policy role of political advisers is ridden with certain challenges. One such 
fundamental challenge reflects the nature and dimension of the policy work those actors undertake: 
a) advisers undertake multiple tasks, b) their policy work is highly variable and c) their work can 
also be highly contingent (Maley 2015, p. 47). It is for this reason that many scholars are wary of 
using classification schemes and types to abstractly describe the policy work of advisers (Maley 
2015).  
 
In order to categorize advisers into types we collect data on the following characteristics suggested 
by Connaughton’s (2010a) typology: profile, political role, communication role, policy role and 
impact. The data is collected through a series of questionnaire survey questions ranging from 
ranking primary job functions to giving the frequency of time spent in broad political, 
communication and policy related activities and more specific tasks.   
 
 
Figure 1: Characteristics of adviser roles. Source Connaughton 2010a 
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1.3 Arenas 
 
According to Maley (2015, p.47) “it is useful to understand the policy work of partisan staff as 
occurring in three different arenas: working with the department; working with other ministers 
(within the political executive) and working with stakeholders”. In each of the above arenas 
advisers’ roles have a different character and purpose. In some of them policy activities are part of 
a core part of advisers’ work, arising from the institutional dynamics and context in which this 
work is embedded. In others, advisers’ work is seen as an opportunity, rather than as responsibility. 
In the case of Australia, the first and second arenas come up as core policy work dimensions. 
Working with the department means supervising, orienting and mobilising departments, 
generating ideas, developing and implementing policy (Maley 2015, p.48-50). Working within the 
executive means facilitating decision making, resolving policy conflict and coordinating new 
policy (Maley 2015, p. 51-53). The third arena comes up as more of an opportunity rather than as 
a responsibility. The third arena involves horizontal policy work. It is where ideas are linked to 
interests and opportunities, mobilisation and bargaining in terms of building political support takes 
place, and policy is delivered (Maley 2015, p. 53-54). What should we expect to be the case for 
ministerial cabinet system advisers?  
 
H5: Ministerial cabinet system adviser work within the department is a core responsibility  
 
The literature reveals that advisers in ministerial cabinets “both advise the minister and exercise 
control over the ministry in his/her name” OECD (2011, p. 23). Advisers in such systems interfere 
in the chain of command issuing instructions and giving orders, exposing “civil servants to 
pressures to breach their political neutrality” (James 2007, p. 9). In view of this, ministerial cabinet 
advisers’ work within the department should be expected as a core responsibility, exercised mostly 
in a top down manner (control and command).   
 
H6: Ministerial cabinet adviser work across the executive is a core responsibility  
 
Arguably, working in the second arena should also be regarded as part of ministerial cabinet 
advisers’ core work. Coordination/communication has been suggested as one of four main ‘policy’ 
oriented, ‘non-partitocratic’ ministerial cabinet functions (Walgrave et al 2004, p. 9). Be it due to 
a coalition government tradition (Belgium) or as an answer to core executive and even 
administrative fragmentation (Greece, EC), the expectation here is that the average ministerial 
cabinet adviser is highly active in working within the executive.   
 
H7: Ministerial cabinet adviser work with stakeholders becomes a responsibility as we move from 
non-coordinated, non-cooperative patterns of policy formation to more institutionalised ones   
 
Finally, as ministerial cabinet theory is largely vague on this, expectations in regards to ministerial 
cabinet advisers’ work in the third arena become more difficult to define. In a consociational 
democracy, with a moderately strong corporatist tradition like the Belgian one (Siaroff 1999, 
p.184), we would expect advisers work with stakeholders to come up as more of a responsibility 
rather than opportunity. The same applies to the European Commission, who projects a tradition 
of systematically granting access to interest groups, as well as activating stakeholders to participate 
through various measures (ie Forum politics). On the contrary, we would not expect this to be the 
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case for Greece, since majoritarian executive politics dominate, leading to a pattern of policy 
formation that is largely non-coordinated and non-cooperative.   
 
1.4 Methods 
 
The present paper is not derived by a single cohesive study. It is the result of three separate studies 
on Greek, European Commission and Belgian advisers designed and conducted in three different 
periods: 2012-2013, 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 respectively. All three studies fall within the 
framework of a common research line on political advisers in ministerial cabinet systems.   
 
The choice to focus on these three ministerial cabinet system cases reflects a combination of 
methodological and pragmatic reasons. In relation to the former the idea was to investigate a 
historical, close to the ideal-type, ministerial cabinet system, a newer one and an 
established/consolidated one, but at the supranational level. In relation to the latter we chose 
Belgium instead of France and Greece instead of Portugal or Italy because of better access to data 
and linguistic proximity of the researchers. Finally, the European Commission is the only 
established/consolidated ministerial cabinet system at the supranational level. The idea is to 
gradually cover the whole population of ministerial cabinet systems.  
 
All three studies have been using mixed data collection methods relying on a questionnaire survey 
followed by interviews with advisers and the people they work most closely with (ministers and 
senior civil servants) in order to triangulate the data (table 1). As already mentioned above data 
have been collected on the policy cycle, profiles, political, communication and policy roles, adviser 
impact and the arenas in which they work. For this we used forced choice questions the majority 
of which asked advisers to either rank or point to frequencies of time spent in various activities. 
Some open questions were also used in case respondents wanted to add something. The interviews 
took place with advisers who have already completed the questionnaire, were accessible and their 
answers raised interesting further questions.  
 
Table 1: summary of data collection methods 
Ministerial 
Cabinet 
System 
Survey Interviews 
Belgium 
(2014-2015) 
25-item survey with both 
forced-choice and open-ended questions distributed to  
88 advisers in 18 ministerial cabinets of the Belgian 
federal government as they stood in March 2014 
 
Respondents N= 40 (7F– 25M, postgraduates degrees 
93,75%, experience with public sector 64,9%)  
Response rate = 45,5% 
 
3 semi-structured 
interviews with 
advisers 
 
*Interviews are still 
taking place 
Greece (2012-
2013) 
 
28-item survey with both 
forced-choice and open-ended questions distributed to 
65 advisers in two purposefully selected ministerial 
cabinets of the Ministry for Development 
2 Interviews with the 
cabinet’s ministers 
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Respondents N= 28 (19M – 9F, 67,8% postgraduate 
degrees, 46,4% with previous cabinet experience) 
Response rate = 43,1% 
4 interviews with 
senior civil servants at 
the Director and 
Director General 
Level 
European 
Commission 
(2014-2015) 
 
19-item survey with both 
forced-choice and open-ended questions distributed to 
135 EC Cabinet advisers at all European Commission 
cabinets as they stood in May 2014.  
 
Respondents N= 16 (9F - 7M, 93,75% postgraduate 
degrees, 62,5% with experience from working in the 
Commission) 
Response rate = 11.8% 
 
**Work is being repeated due to low response rate. 
need >25% 
 
4 interviews with 
Members of Cabinet 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
Respondents N= 84 
Response rate = 29,1%  
Interviews N=10  
 
 
2. Context 
 
In Belgium, Greece, Italy, France, Portugal, the European Commission and increasingly Spain, 
ministerial cabinets (MCs) make up the institutional habitat of political advisers. This is different 
to the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands or Sweden, where advisers work alongside a neutral civil 
service and it is also different to cases such as for instance the Slovak Republic, where the 
bureaucracy’s top tier is also politicised (James 2007, p. 9, OECD 2011, p. 23). A ministerial 
cabinet is not to be confused with a government cabinet comprising ministers. While it may be 
seen as part of the core executive, it essentially forms a formal institutionalised political and policy 
advisory system. It differs from other systems in that its members not only advise the minister but 
also provide political direction and management to the entire ministry. They issue instructions to 
the ministry in the minister’s name, while its leading members usually have the right to sign 
documents on the minister’s behalf and do often represent him/her at external events, speaking in 
his/her name both within and outside the ministry (James 2007). Ministerial cabinets are usually 
composed of a mixture of civil servants and external appointees, who are expected, at least, to be 
sympathetic to the minister’s views (James 2007).  
 
Ministerial cabinets and the political advisers working within them have been around as early as 
the beginning of parliamentary representative democracy in the 1800s (table 2). Belgium and 
France, the oldest and closest to the ideal type ministerial cabinet systems were initially set up to 
control monarchical influence, but later developed into instruments of political control and 
coordination. Post WWII they were followed by Italy and the European Commission, and since 
the 1980s by Greece and Portugal.     
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Table 2: Institutionalisation of ministerial cabinets: Belgium, Greece and the European 
Commission  
Ministerial cabinet 
system 
 
Year of establishment Reason 
Belgium  1840’s Emancipation from monarchical influence 
especially in policy & personnel allocation 
Greece 1981-1985 
Restoration of Democracy 
in 1974  
First Socialist government aims to 
circumscribe the administrative hierarchy 
and establish political control over what 
was perceived as a right wing and hostile to 
its aspirations senior civil service 
European 
Commission 
1958 Creation of the EC & 
the EEC 
To improve horizontal and vertical co-
ordination within the EC 
 
To emphasize the political role the 
Commission was to play in the creation of 
European political Union 
 
Advisers in ministerial cabinet systems are numerous in comparison to their counterparts in non-
cabinet systems, where despite increases since the 1980s their number still remains comparatively 
limited. Table 3 summarises the size of the three ministerial cabinet systems under investigation. 
 
 
Table 3: Cabinet size: Belgium, Greece and the European Commission 
Ministerial 
Cabinet System 
Number of 
Ministerial 
Cabinets 
Total Number of 
Cabinet Staff 
(Advisory + 
Auxiliary) 
Average 
cabinet size 
Total Number of 
Advisers (de facto) 
Average Total number of 
advisers per cabinet 
Belgium 
Snapshot March 
2014 18 + PM cabinet 534 (564 incl. PM) 29.7 
De facto 440 
 
 
Strict status 293 
24,8 (de facto) 
 
 
 
15,4 (strict status) 
European 
Commission 
snapshot May 
2014 28 621 22.2 Est. 229 8,2 
Greece snapshot 
December 2012 37 Est. 1200 32.4 NA 
Statutory 9 minimum to 34 
maximum 
4 Special Advisers or Sp. 
Associates 
5 Scientific Associates 
(5 or 10 or 14 or 30) 
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The literature on ministerial cabinets reveals that their very raison d’ être is associated to the 
functions they perform. It has been suggested that these functions can be divided into partitocratic 
and non-partitocratic ones (Walgrave et al 2004) or between political and policy functions (Brans 
et al. 2006; Brans and Steen 2006, p. 66). On the more partitocratic, political front, ministerial 
cabinets: 
 Allow for a firm hold of partisan politics on the administration (Walgrave et al 2004, p. 8).  
 Are tools for party control over ministers and for supporting party organisations, with 
political parties imposing senior personnel and at times even forcing lower personnel to 
the minister (Dewachter 1981 and De Winter 1981 quoted in Walgrave 2007, p. 8).  
 Appear to form career pools and recruitment mechanisms for professional politicians 
(Brans and Steen 2007, p. 66).  
 Sharpen the grasp of political parties on the civil service and the wider public sector as a 
whole, especially through facilitating the appointment and promotion of befriended civil 
servants (Walgrave 2004, p. 8).  
 
Partitocratic functions, though, are arguably closely associated to the main dysfunctions of the 
ministerial cabinet system.  
 
During the 1990s and before the Copernicus reform in the early 2000s, ministerial cabinets in 
Belgium were criticised for “encroachment” of their members on civil service’ s territory, as well 
as for developing into “shadow administrations” frustrating the civil servants (Brans and Steen 
2006, p. 67). It was for this reason that the Copernicus reform set to contain the dominance of 
ministerial cabinets, even abolishing them in name, as well as de-politicise the Belgian civil 
service. However, as Brans and Steen (2006, p. 77-78) inform us “ministerial cabinets were re-
invented”. The new rules were implemented in such a way as to “re-invent mechanisms of political 
control over the administration” (Brans et al 2006; Brans and Steen 2006, p. 77-78). 
 
In Greece, the establishment of ministerial cabinets in the 1980s saw a confrontational start, when 
some civil servants resorted to the supreme administrative court in order keep political advisers at 
bay (Gouglas 2015, p. 18). The 1990s saw a new form of coexistence among politicians, political 
staff, and civil servants (Sotiropoulos, 2007). Spanou (2001, pp. 109–110) coined this a “symbiotic 
relationship,” where top civil servants offer political submission and wide policy discretion to the 
political executive in return for taking the civil service’s view into account, especially in personnel 
and management issues. However, as Sotiropoulos (2007) rightly pointed, despite the political elite 
being increasingly forced to take the views of the civil service into consideration, it has never 
really lost the upper hand. Cabinets still dominate the policy process in Greece, working as a “mini-
public administration” (Gouglas 2015, p. 18). 
 
Referring to the European Commission cabinets in the 1990s, Wille (2013, p.100) has described 
them as a shadow bureaucracy that increasingly resembles its national counterparts, one with ‘too 
many pimply boys with too much power’, who serve as the ‘political eyes and ears’ of their boss. 
Cabinets have also been central in the Commission staff policy, monitoring the national balance 
of staff, putting forward candidates for senior positions and interfering in appointments down to 
the most junior level (Seidel 2010 in Wille p. 101). Unlike Belgium and Greece, though, there 
seems to be wide agreement that the 1999 Prodi - Kinnock reform of the Commission 
administration normalised relations between the EC cabinets and the Commission high civil 
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service by redefining the roles of cabinets and drawing “sharper lines of responsibility between 
cabinets and services” (Wille 2013, p. 98). As Bauer and Ege (2013, p.193) argued at the start of 
the millennium, the Kinnock reform, which implemented crucial changes in strategic and 
personnel management, led to “an ever less politicised Commission administration, in an ever 
more politicised organisational context”.  
 
On the ‘policy’ (non-partitocratic) front Walgrave et al (2004, p. 9) has argued that ministerial 
cabinets serve four main functions:  
 
a) Communication: By communication the authors refer primarily to coordination, which in 
the case of Belgium takes the form of coordination of the coalition government (Walgrave 
et al 2004, p. 9). Brans and Steen (2006, p.66) refer to ministerial cabinets as centres of 
communication and coordination, which facilitate the continuity to coalition government. 
In the case of Greece communication may be seen as coordination of a core executive 
government that has been described as fragmented and suffering from a “deep rooted 
problem of coordination” (Gouglas 2015, p. 17, Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2013, pp. 
524, 525). Similarly to Greece, the European Commission has also been described as 
suffering from fragmentation and deep coordination deficits due to the inherent 
characteristics of its organization (Seidel 2010 in Wille 2013, p. 101): on the one hand, 
Directorate Generals are thought to form small ‘fiefdoms’, accomplishing their duties in 
an introspective way and pursuing their own agendas; on the other hand, the Commission 
is composed of persons with no shared background, ideology or sense of common fate to 
bind them.  
b) Expertise: Ministerial cabinets are also projected as “brain trusts” that pool expertise 
together (De Winter 1981, p. 66). Because of this function, James (2007), the OECD (2011) 
and Schreurs et al (2010) have gone as far to claim that the dominant type of adviser found 
in ministerial cabinet systems is the expert. However, as Brans and Steen (2006 p. 67) point 
out in the case of Belgium the production of policy advice occurs in ways that technical 
expertise is combined with political feasibility. 
c) Flexibility. Ministerial cabinets allow for organisational flexibility. This refers to the 
customized nature of the organisation of a cabinet, so as to fit the needs of the political 
executive. Despite formal-legal arrangements pertaining the organisation of the cabinets, 
the status and numbers of advisers, as well as their employment framework, ministers in 
Belgium and Greece have discretion to organise the cabinet work according to their needs, 
even expand the cabinet size if necessary (Gouglas 2015, Gouglas et al 2014). 
Commissioners are here an exception as they are constrained by the codes of conduct, 
usually actively enforced by the President of the EC, but more so by the principle of 
denationalisation and gender balance of cabinet composition. However, even in the 
European Commission, the cabinet structure does provide Commissioner with enough 
flexibility to decide on organisational and personnel issues.    
d) Loyalty: Safeguarding of loyalty to the person of the minister.  
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3. Ministerial cabinet system advisers and the policy cycle 
 
Advisers were asked to point out the exact stage of the policy cycle where they thought they spent 
most of their working time. Overall, it may be argued that the findings on frequency of time spent 
at the various policy cycle stages (table 4) confirm the hypothesis that ministerial cabinet advisers 
enjoy a central role in the “design, formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policy” 
(James 2007, p. 17). Having said this, not all of the policy cycle stages come up as equally 
important. Using Howlett et al’s (2009) policy hourglass metaphor, it may be argued that in 
ministerial cabinets, advisers’ roles are more pronounced in certain stages than in others, looking 
much like a policy hourglass. The front (agenda setting and policy formulation) and back end 
(implementation, evaluation and monitoring) of the policy cycle form the two vertical glass bulbs 
connected by a neck (decision making) that regulates the trickle of policy. This policy hourglass 
looks of course very different from system to system.  
 
It is in the Greek case where its shape is the most balanced. As we move from the top glass bulb, 
the front end of the policy cycle, we squeeze through a neck whose width is much thinner, decision 
making, only to trickle down to a much wider glass bulb, the back end of the policy cycle.      
 
In the case of Belgium the shape becomes more distorted looking like more like a pyramid where 
advisers’ role is progressively reduced as we move from stage to stage. This comes as a bit of a 
paradox if we consider that ministerial cabinets in Belgium hold power over what gets evaluated 
and what not, how, and with what degree of transparency. 
 
Finally, in the case of the European Commission we virtually observe that hourglass has no neck, 
since advisers appear to colonise of all the first four stages of the policy cycle, leaving only 
evaluation and implementation with a thinner shape.  
 
Taking the whole threes systems into consideration what we see is that advisers’ roles look like a 
policy hourglass whose top glass bulb (front end) is over-expanded, trickling through a thinner 
neck down to a glass bulb (back end) that starts big (implementation), but ends thin in the very end 
(evaluation)  
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Table 4: Number of advisers & %, who spend time once a week + daily, per stage of the policy 
cycle (absolute numbers and percentages) 
Policy Cycle Stage 
 
European 
Commission  
N=16 no missing 
values 
Greece 
N=28 no 
missing values 
Belgium 
N=40, missing 7 
Total 
Valid N=77 
Recognizing 
problems - setting 
agenda priorities  
14 (87.5%) 21 (75%) 23 (69,7%) 58 (75,3%) 
Proposing 
Solutions and 
formulating 
policies 
14 (87,5%) 20 (71.4%) 27 (81,8%) 61 (79,2%) 
Deciding on the 
preferred course of 
action  
14 (87,5%) 10 (35,7%) 18 (54,5%) 42 (54,5%) 
Putting solutions 
into effect 
12 (75%) 17 (60,7%) 17 (51,5%) 46 (59,7%) 
Evaluating & 
Monitoring results  
7 (43,75%) 15 (53,5%) 11 (33,3%) 33 (42,8%) 
 
 
4. A classification of policy advisory roles 
We now proceed in classifying ministerial cabinet advisers according to the four policy advisory 
roles suggested by Connaughton (2010, 2010b, 2015): the expert, the partisan, the coordinator and 
the minder. We achieve this by using collected data on policy expertise, primary job functions, 
frequency of activities undertaken and frequency of tasks performed. The aim is to describe the 
main characteristics of advisers’ roles, suggested as important by the typology: profile (specialist, 
generalist or responsive), politics (active, passive or variable), communication (technical, political 
or both), policy making (knowledge, politics or fixer) and impact (expertise, political dominance, 
management or mutuality). Where data exists we triangulate our questionnaire findings with 
interview material.      
4.1 Profile 
Is the profile of the ministerial cabinet adviser that of a specialist, a generalist or is it simply 
responsive to the minister’s mission? As the typology suggests, a specialist is a qualified expert in 
a specific policy field who also exercises this expertise in an assigned ministry portfolio. In view 
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of this, we asked advisers to describe whether, according to the work they do in the cabinet, they 
felt they fit in more appropriately to the role of a generalist or that of a specialist.  
Table 5 presents the findings per ministerial cabinet system. With the exception of the European 
Commission, where advisers perceive themselves as mostly generalists, advisers’ self-perceptions 
in Greece and Belgium are almost equally split in half.    
Table 5: Generalists or Specialists? (Absolute numbers and percentages)  
Specialist or 
Generalist 
 
European Commission  
N=16 no missing values 
Greece 
N=28 no missing 
values 
Belgium 
N=40, missing 4 
Generalists  11 (68,8%)  13 (46,4%) 18 (50%) 
Specialists 5 (31,3%) 15 (53.5%) 18 (50%) 
 
A first interpretation of this table would lead us to believe that Greece and Belgium conform to 
the expectation found in the literature that ministerial cabinet system advisers are principally 
specialists/experts, as opposed to the more generalist strategic advisers found for instance in the 
UK or the assistants / aides found for instance in Denmark (Schreurs et al. 2010). In light of this 
the European Commission appears as a bit of a residual case.   
It would be misleading to take this data at face value. As Walgrave et al (2004, p.13) have argued 
for the case of Belgian ministerial cabinet advisers, “specialist expertise can only be assessed on 
the basis of the departmental stability of the MC activity”. Self-perceptions need to be cross-
examined. To what extent do advisers who perceive themselves as specialists work on a relevant 
to their specialisation/competence policy portfolio? In view of this we asked advisers to define 
their exact area of specialization. The majority of the advisers of our sample do project a high level 
of general expertise, be it in terms of level of education, previous work experience or experience 
from work in the public sector. However, as much as they are highly skilled, data on their actual 
work at the cabinet reveals that advisers of our sample are competence shifters, working mostly in 
different portfolios than their expert competence and changing such portfolios over time.  
In the case of Greece, where self-perceptions of specialisation ran higher, from the 15 advisers 
who stated they are specialists, only 6 (40%), stated that they specialize in a ministry portfolio. In 
the case of Belgium from the 18 advisers perceiving themselves as specialists a bit more than half 
10 (55%) stated the same. Even in the case of the European Commission, where perceptions 
appeared to be closer to reality, 1 adviser out of the 5 who claimed to be specialists was not.  
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Table 6: Specialists? Perceptions and reality 
Specialists  European Commission  
N=16 no missing values 
Greece 
N=28 no missing 
values 
Belgium 
N=40, missing 4 
Absolute number of 
self-perceived 
specialists & % of total 
adviser sample  
5 (31,3% ) 15 (53.5%) 18 (50%) 
Absolute number of 
non-real specialists & 
% out of total number 
of self-perceived 
specialists  
1 (25%)  6 (40%) 10 (55,6%) 
 
The above findings are in line with previous large N research on Belgian advisers covering the 
period 1970 to 1999. Walgrave et al (2004, p.13) found that members of cabinets, despite their 
high expertise “do not show much homogeneity in the ministerial portfolios they serve”. 
Ministerial cabinet advisers are not devoted in one policy branch, the one of their expertise, but 
alter positions frequently, demonstrating a high level of competence mobility. The above is also 
further corroborated by interview data.  
As EC adviser 1 stated  
I, despite being an expert in competition law, was asked to follow the economic crisis. [Own 
translation]  
Belgian Adviser 30 also stated  
There are a lot of files which in technical terms I did not know a lot about. Then I tried to become 
familiar with these topics, but I did not have any knowledge on them beforehand. I learned it thanks 
to the people in the administration. [Own translation] 
4.2 Policy roles 
Is the ministerial cabinet adviser a fixer, acting as a manager who facilitates the oversight of the 
ministry’s agenda? Alternatively, does the policy role of this actor rely on knowledge or politics? 
Or is the ministerial cabinet system adviser policy passive, simply minding the minister? In order 
to understand this we asked advisers to point and rank what they consider to be their three primary 
job functions. Additionally, we asked them to state the frequency of time spent in certain broad 
policy activities and then more specific tasks. The idea was to be able to discern between steering 
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and more technical policy functions. Questionnaire material is further triangulated with interview 
material.     
Looking at the data on Belgium we observe that Belgian ministerial cabinet advisers at the federal 
level perceive the provision of strategic advice as their top primary job function (table 7). Despite 
being involved in the nuts and bolts of policy making figures high, it is mainly a third choice. 
Coordination and management comes up as a slightly less frequent policy activity than 
involvement with policy technicalities, and this may lead us to believe that steering is less 
important. However, data on the frequency of specific tasks reveals a tendency towards steering 
rather than technicalities.  
Table 7: Policy role of the Belgian Adviser 
Nature of 
policy function 
/activity / task 
Top 3 Primary 
Job Functions 
Very Frequent 
Activities  
(Once a week & 
daily) 
Very Frequent Tasks  
(Once a week & daily) 
Steering Strategic Advice  
(67,6%) 
41,1% as 1st 
choice 
 
Coordination and 
management (45,4%) 
Ask officials to provide memos 
or advice (66,6%) 
Read and comment on official 
departmental advice (75,7%) 
Monitor the implementation of 
policy (24,2%) 
Technical Being involved in 
the nuts and bolts 
of policy (52,9%) 
32,3% as 3rd 
choice 
Policy Technicalities 
(72,7%) 
Analyse and evaluate 
implemented policy (33,3%) 
Prepare policy files and memos 
(87,8%) 
Produce evidence and facts in 
support of policy making 
(42,4%) 
 
The steering heavy nature of the Belgian adviser’s work is further corroborated by interview 
material.  According to Belgian Adviser 30: 
There is an administration but it needs steering. It has to respect the timing, it needs a lot of time 
and meetings with the heads of sections. To see where, with the administration, we want to go. 
When do the proposals need to be ready, when are we going to talk about them on the political 
level, when with the stakeholders. For this, there is a need for a lot of internal steering in order to 
get the text good and perfect, to be sure it will be passed. Is the text ready? It should have been 
ready by today. Yes, but it is only going to be ready tomorrow. This takes up a big part of your 
time. [Own translation] 
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According to Belgian Adviser 22: 
We are only intermediaries between the minister and the administration that executes the task. 
Because the Minister cannot do everything on his own he has employees who liaise with the 
administration and on the other hand look at their results and output and comment on them. [Own 
translation] 
Overall, it may be argued that the average policy profile of the Belgian adviser appears to be that 
of a strategic adviser who steers policy, a “fixer” who mends, monitors policy and intervenes, 
while being also frequently involved in the nuts and bolts of policy technicalities. 
Moving now to the Greek case (table 8) the data in hand reveals that the average Greek adviser is 
also highly involved with the technicalities of policy making. However, much like their Belgian 
counterparts, Greek advisers focus more on steering, rather than on the technical side of policy 
making. A difference between Belgian and Greek advisers is that the latter perceive themselves 
more clearly as policy managers, rather than strategic advisers. This may reflect two things: a) a 
sample bias caused by minister related specificities and preferences. The two ministers under 
investigation projected a clear tendency in organising and staffing their office with project 
managers and this may be a preference specific to their management style. b) a time period bias 
caused by the fact that policy making in the period under investigation took place within the strict 
policy conditionality of  the Economic Adjustment Program. In such a strict environment strategic 
choices are usually decided beforehand, targets are already set in advance, space for manoeuvre is 
rather limited and advisers act as time managers and accelerators of the government program. As 
Connaughton (2015, p. 40) argues about Irish advisers the economic adjustment program “has 
necessitated ministerial advisers to become more focused on the delivery of reforms”.   
Table 8: Policy role of Greek advisers 
Nature of policy 
function /activity 
/ task 
Top 3 Primary Job 
Functions 
Very Frequent 
Activities  
(Once a week & daily) 
Very Frequent Tasks  
(Once a week & daily) 
Steering Managing Projects 
(71.4%) 
 
Coordination & 
Management (71.4%)  
 
 
 
Ask officials to provide memos or 
advice (67,8%) 
Read and comment on official 
departmental advice (64.2%)  
Monitor the implementation of 
policy (35.67%)   
Technical Formulating policy 
measures (42.8%) 
Policy technicalities 
(53.5%) 
Analyse and evaluate implemented 
policy (50%)  
Prepare policy files and memos 
(42.77%)   
Produce evidence and facts in 
support of policy making (42.8%) 
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Having said this, we can safely argue that what seems to be beyond doubt is the role of Greek 
advisers as fixers. This is also corroborated by interviews with both the political executive and the 
senior civil service. 
 
According to Greek Minister A:  
 
The adviser’s main role is complementary to that of the administration. He speeds up the policy 
process, facilitating its implementation… Essentially he acts as a multiplier and an accelerator, 
fast and in a wide range of areas… The adviser is the timing belt, the gear that connects the 
crankshaft to the camshaft, making the government machine work on time. [Own translation] 
This facilitation – acceleration function of the ministerial adviser has also sprung up in one of our 
interviews with top civil servants. According to SCS respondent 1: 
 
Beyond input in ideas and knowledge, the adviser can accelerate the policy process and in this 
way better service the citizen. [Own translation] 
 
Moving, finally, to the European Commission cabinet advisers, it may be argued that unlike their 
Greek counterparts, but much like their Belgian peers, EC advisers perceive themselves as strategic 
advisers who coordinate and manage policy, while liaising with other parts of the Commission 
(Table 9). Much like both Belgian and Greek advisers, EC Cabinet advisers appear to be also 
highly focused on policy steering. This is evident both in the frequency of policy activities 
performed and even more so in the time spent on specific policy tasks.    
Table 9: Policy role of the EC cabinet adviser 
Nature of 
policy function 
/ activity / task 
Top 3 Primary Job 
Functions 
Very Frequent Policy 
Activities (once a week 
& daily) 
  
Very Frequent Policy Tasks  
(once a week & daily) 
Steering Strategic advice 
advisers (87,5%)  
 
Liaising with the EU 
Commission DGs 
(56,25%)  
Coordination & 
Management (93,75%) 
 
 
Ask officials to provide memos 
or advice on specific policy 
issues (93,75%) 
 
Read and comment on 
departmental advice (93,75%) 
 
Monitor the implementation of 
policy (56,25%) 
Technical Nuts and bolts of 
policy 
(43,75%) 
 
Policy technicalities 
(80%) 
Prepare policy files and memos 
(93,75%)   
 
Analyse and evaluate 
implemented policy 
(62,25%) 
 
Spend time in producing 
evidence and facts in support of 
policy making (37,5%)  
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4.3 Political role 
Is the ministerial cabinet adviser’s political role active, passive, or variable? In order to understand 
this we asked advisers to point and rank what they consider to be their three primary job functions. 
Additionally, we asked them to state the frequency of time spent in certain broad policy activities 
and more specific tasks. The idea was to be able to discern between active, passive and variable 
political roles. The provided answers were triangulated through interviews.   
The data in hand (table 10) reveals that the Belgian adviser is a highly active political agent. 
Despite projecting some passivity or variability in relation to certain policy functions or tasks, 
overall the data point to an active political role with a special function in relation to looking out 
for potentially harmful issues to the minister. 
Table 10: Political role of the Belgian adviser 
Nature of 
political 
role 
Top 3 primary 
functions 
Very Frequent Political 
Activities (once a week 
& daily) 
 
Very Frequent Political 
Tasks 
(once a week & daily) 
 
Active  
(more than 
40%) 
Advising on political 
considerations 
(55,8%) 
 
Looking out for affairs 
affecting the minister  
(84,8%) 
Politics (Party, MPs, 
Minister’s electoral 
district, Networking) 
(51,5%) 
Convey or clarify Minister’s 
wishes (66,6%)  
Represent the minister at 
departmental meetings 
(63,6%) 
 
Passive 
(less than 
30%) 
  Meet with MPs (21,2%) 
Receive external delegations 
on the ministers behalf 
(21,2%)  
Variable 
(between 
30% and 
40%) 
  Represent the minister at 
public events 9+1 (30,3%) 
Raise and debate new policy 
initiatives with the Minister 
11 (33,3%) 
 
The interview material corroborates this. Belgian Adviser 30 places the previously discussed issues 
of technical expertise/specialisation and policy roles into its political context.  
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I think that in Belgium your network and politics are more important than your technical 
knowledge. […] Networking with other political parties also plays a big role: negotiation on if we 
are going to launch something and conditions for other parties. This is how it works. [Own 
translation] 
Belgian Adviser 30 also gives further insight into the political role of advisers: 
When you launch something there are many invitations for the minister to say something about it. 
S/he cannot go to every event, so then you jump in for the minister. Sometimes you are also alone 
in the Parliament. Then you represent him/her in the parliamentary commissions. Those are the 
two most important cases when you represent the minister… and sometimes also receptions as 
well. There are a lot of receptions at night. Then you have to go, because it is there where you 
meet a lot of people. There you also go to as the responsible of the minister, also because people 
there see you that way. [Own translation] 
The question then becomes to what extent is the Belgian adviser also a party apparatchik? The 
answers to the questionnaire above reveal that Belgian advisers act more as minister 
bodyguards/minders, than partisans.  
According to Belgian Adviser 40 an adviser does not have to be a party member, though sharing 
similar political opinions to the minister clearly helps. 
Not having a member card does not play a role, sharing preferences plays a role as long as this is 
on the specific policy field you will be working on. If you think that there needs to be austerity on 
the cabinet of social security, but your minister thinks the opposite, well then you won't go working 
there. On the other hand, in an environmental ministry, you can perfectly differ on opinions on 
marriages because it does not matter anyway. Then you can have an interesting discussion, but 
the minister won’t fire you because of this. It is about reliability: they need to know that you are 
reliable to the minister. Whether you are a member or not is not the most important thing, although 
sometimes pressure is being put on this from time to time. [Own translation] 
Belgian Adviser 22 also highlights this point: 
I was part of a Vice-Minister's cabinet, and in the negotiations with the other parties I had to 
defend the opinion of the Minister. [Own translation] 
In contrast to Belgian advisers, Greek advisers’ political role comes up as much more variable 
(table 11). To begin with, an important minority, 35%, do consider providing advice on political 
considerations as one of advisers’ top three primary job functions. Moreover, certain political tasks 
such as conveying ministerial demands to the bureaucracy also come up as important. Yet, others 
like representing the minister appear to be less pronounced. What is impressive is how little time, 
comparatively to their Belgian counterparts, Greek advisers appear to spend in overt political 
activities and specific political tasks, especially of the partisan nature. Is there an explanation? 
According to Gouglas (2015, p. 21) overt political work of the partisan type in Greece, for example 
elections or maintaining support for the minister and relations with the party, is mainly outsourced 
to the political-electoral office (Vouleftiko Grafeio) that the minister maintains as a Member of 
Parliament. In one of the interviews Greek Senior Civil Servant 4 highlighted that there may also 
be a trend away from typical political party apparatchik advisers   
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Old advisers were more party oriented. In the last years there has been an increase in quality. You 
get people with higher skills and standards. This is a general trend irrespective of who the Minister 
is. [Own translation] 
Table 11: Political Role of Greek Adviser 
Nature of 
political 
role 
Top 3 primary 
functions 
Very Frequent Political 
Activities (once a week 
& daily) 
 
Very Frequent Political 
Tasks 
(once a week & daily) 
 
Active  
(More than 
40%) 
  Convey or clarify Minister’s 
wishes (57,1%) 
Passive 
(less than 
30%) 
 Politics (Party, MPs, 
Minister’s electoral 
district, Networking) 
(25%) 
Maintain relations with the 
electoral district of the 
minister (10,7%) 
Meet with MPs (10,7%) 
Meet with Party officials 
(10,7%)  
Receive external delegations 
on the ministers behalf 
(21,4%) 
Variable 
(30%) 
Advising on political 
considerations 
(35,57%) 
 Represent minister at 
departmental meetings 
(32,1%) 
 
 
Finally, looking at the political role of European Commission Cabinet advisers we observe that 
those actors project a variable role in terms of primary job function perceptions, but a highly active 
one in terms of political role activities and specific tasks of a political nature. How can this be 
interpreted? Much like in the Belgian and Greek cases EC advisers’ active or variable political role 
is focused on maintaining the commissioner’s line through to the administration. The high score 
in the politics dimension, if it is interpreted as partisanship is a bit of a paradox. However, the 
interview material clarifies the non-partisan but highly political nature of EC advisers’ political 
work.       
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Table 12: Political role of EC cabinet adviser 
Nature 
of 
political 
role 
Top 3 primary 
functions 
Very Frequent Political 
Activities (once a week 
& daily) 
 
Very Frequent Political 
Tasks 
(once a week & daily) 
 
Active  
(>40%) 
 Politics (Party, MPs, 
Minister’s electoral 
district, Networking) 
(68,75%) 
Convey or clarify 
Commissioner’s wishes 
(100%) 
Represent the Commissioner 
in internal meetings (87,5%) 
Receive external delegations 
on the Commissioner’s 
behalf (56,25%) 
Passive 
(<30%) 
  Meet with MEPs (18,75%) 
Variable 
(30% - 
40%) 
Advice on political 
considerations (50%) 
rank it as 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 
choice,  
 Represent the Commissioner 
in public events (31,25%) 
 
According to EC Cabinet Adviser 1  
Commissioners usually do bring one single partisan, responsible for constituency work back home, 
but this is usually it”. [Own translation] 
 EC Cabinet Adviser 2 also corroborates the above 
We are less partisans. This is because, in our case, the Commissioner is not going to return (to 
her constituency). Even her appointment was not based on party affiliations but rather on her 
popularity and expertise. So we generally do not have to do much on this field. Of course, some of 
my colleagues are assigned to monitor the [national] media and the situation in the [country] 
because she is [nationality] and wants to be aware of these things”. [Own translation] 
 
4.4 Communication role 
Having analysed the relevant data on the profile, policy and political role of EC cabinet advisers, 
we now proceed into analysing data concerning a fourth characteristic, their communication role. 
Does it reflect political or technical/managerial characteristics, or maybe both? In order to 
understand this we asked advisers to point and rank what they consider to be their three primary 
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job functions. Additionally, we asked them to state the frequency of time spent in certain broad 
communication activities and more specific communication tasks.  
Belgian advisers appear to have a variable communication role (table 13). In terms of the actual 
art of media and political communication, which requires both technical and political work, they 
do not perceive it to be a primary job function. This is understandable, given the presence of 
organized communication and press teams within the ministerial cabinets. However, almost half 
of the advisers in our sample appear to spend significant time in dealing with media and 
communication activities, though paradoxically in the Belgian case this does not translate into 
being highly involved with writing press statements or speeches. This can be explained as political 
advisers being involved in policy portfolios are also providing feedback to their media and 
communication colleagues who do most of the media and communication work. Outside 
conventional media and communication functions, activities and tasks, there is also adviser 
communication and interaction with the department, which can also involve technical and political 
work. At the more technical side, as we saw above the average Belgian adviser frequently asks 
officials to provide memos or advice, while on the more political one s/he conveys/clarifies the 
ministers wishes to the administration.   
Table 13: Communication role of Belgian advisers 
Nature of 
communication 
role 
Top 3 primary 
functions 
Frequency of 
Communication 
Activities  
 
(once a week & 
daily) 
 
Frequency of Communication 
Tasks 
(once a week & daily) 
 
Technical/Mana
gement 
  Ask officials to provide memos 
or advice (81,8%) 
Political   Convey / clarify minister’s 
wishes (66,6%) 
Both  Providing media 
and communication 
advice (15,1%) 
Communication with 
the media (45,4%) 
Write Press Statements (21,2%) 
Write Speeches (18,2%) 
 
Greek advisers also appear to have a variable communication role (table 14). About a fourth of 
them perceive media and communication to be their primary job function, which ranks them higher 
than Belgium. Much like in the case of Belgium though, a greater number is involved in media 
and communication activities (42,8%). To the extent Greek advisers consider media and 
communication as part of their primary job functions, as well as to the extent they are involved in 
such activities, which among others include writing up speeches and press statements, Greek 
advisers use both technical (drafting, presenting) and political communication skills (targeting the 
public with a political message). Beyond conventional media and communication roles, which 
target the public, Greek advisers also communicate within the department. There too their 
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communication role appears to be variable. To the extent they ask the department’s view on policy 
this falls within their more managerial communication function. To the extent they convey and 
clarify the minister’s wishes this is clearly a more political communication role.  
Table 14: Communication role of Greek advisers 
Nature of 
communication role 
Top 3 primary 
functions 
Frequency of 
Communication 
Activities  
 
(once a week & 
daily) 
 
Frequency of 
Communication 
Tasks 
(once a week & daily) 
 
Technical/Management   Ask officials to 
provide memos or 
advice (67.8%) 
Political   Convey / clarify 
minister’s wishes 
(57.1%)  
Both  Providing Media and 
Communication 
Advice  
8 (28.5%)  
Media and 
Communication  
12 (42,8%) 
Write Press 
Statements 9 (32,1%) 
Write Speeches 6 
(21,4%) 
 
European Commission cabinet advisers also appear to have a variable communication role (table 
15). As in the case of Belgium and Greece, only a small fraction appears to consider media and 
communication as part of their primary job activities, yet a higher percentage gets frequently 
involved in media and communication activities. In the case of the EC a significantly higher 
number of advisers is involved in writing up speeches and press statements. Beyond, media and 
communication per se, which require a synthesis of both technical and political communication 
roles, advisers appear to spend significant time in writing up strategy papers and policy reports, 
which again reveal a dual communication role that requires both technical and political criteria. 
On the fully political side of things advisers represent the Commissioner and convey his/her 
wishes. On the fully technical/managerial aspect of their work they appear to mobilise their 
Directorate General’s (DG) resources through various tasks like asking civil servants to provide 
memos and official advice on specific topics.     
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Table 15: Communication role of EC cabinet advisers 
Nature of 
communication 
functions / activities / 
tasks 
Top 3 primary 
functions 
Frequency of 
Communication 
Activities (once a 
week & daily) 
 
Frequency of 
Communication Tasks 
(once a week & daily) 
 
Technical / 
Management 
  Ask officials to provide 
memos or advice on 
specific policy issues 15 
(93,75%) 
Political   Convey or clarify 
Commissioner’s wishes 
16 (100%) 
Both  Media and 
Communication 
Advice 1+3 (25%) 
Media and 
Communication 7 
(43,75%) 
Write Strategy Plans and 
Policy Reports 13 
(81,25%) 
Write speeches 10 
(62,5%) 
Write Press Statements 7 
(43,75%) 
 
4.5 Impact 
Having analysed data on advisers’ profile, policy, political and communication roles we are now 
able to analyse and decide on the final characteristic, which is crucial for the typology, advisers’ 
impact. Is the impact of EC cabinet advisers mainly expertise, politics, management or mutuality? 
We answer this question through an analysis of the data gathered in the questionnaire as a whole, 
as well as through material gathered in interviews. 
To begin with, the impact of the average Belgian adviser appears to be management (coordinator) 
followed by mutuality (minder). The Belgian adviser comes up as a fixer who is also highly 
politically active, by acting as the minister’s bodyguard. The aim behind this role is not political 
dominance, but primarily the protection of the minister from issues that may be potentially 
harmful.    
Greek advisers, too, appear to be “fixers within the policy-making process, who are not overtly 
partisan, but are politically aware, concentrating primarily on managing the ministry’s program 
and ensuring that policy output remains on track” (Gouglas 2015, p. 21). In this respect, Greek 
advisers’ impact appears as a more clear-cut case of management in terms of impact rather than 
knowledge, political dominance or mutuality.  
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Finally, much like in the case of Belgium, in the case of the European Commission, advisers’ 
impact appears to be a synthesis between management and mutuality. First of all their impact is 
management, as they perform significant policy steering functions, activities and tasks. Second, 
they come up as highly active political agents, not in relation to ensuring the Commissioner’s 
political dominance (after all Commissioners are not re-elected) but as was the case of Belgium in 
respect to mutuality. They are politically alert, looking actively for politically harmful issues to 
the Commissioner’s agenda (Gouglas et al 2014).  
4.6 Conclusion: Experts, Minders, Coordinators or Partisans? 
Where does this all leave us in relation to Connaughton’s (2010a, 2010b, 2015) typology? There 
are two ways of approaching the subject. First, based on the data above we come up with the 
average adviser type per ministerial cabinet system. We adopt this aggregate level approach for all 
three ministerial cabinet systems. Second, we could also classify advisers on an individual basis. 
This individual level analysis offers greater precision, but thus far it has only been conducted in 
the case of Belgian ministerial cabinet advisers.  
Table 16 below summarises the characteristics of advisers roles and based on this scores the 
dominant type of adviser found in every ministerial cabinet system.  
Table 16: Average Adviser Type per ministerial cabinet system 
Cabinet 
System 
Profile Political 
role 
Communication 
role 
Policy 
making role 
Impact ADVISER TYPE 
Belgium Generalist 
(coordinator) 
Active  
(Minder 
not 
Partisan) 
Both 
technical/manage
rial and political 
(coordinator) 
Fixer  
(coordinator) 
Management  
(coordinator) 
Mutuality  
(minder) 
Coordinator / 
minder hybrid 
Greece Generalist 
(coordinator) 
Variable 
(coordin
ator) 
Both 
technical/manage
rial and political 
(coordinator) 
Fixer  
(Coordinator) 
Management 
(Coordinator) 
 
Coordinator pure 
Europea
n 
Commis
sion 
 Generalist  
(coordinator) 
 Active 
(Minder 
not 
partisan)  
Both 
technical/manage
rial and political 
(coordinator) 
Fixer 
(coordinator) 
 
 Management  
(coordinator) 
Mutuality 
(minder) 
Knowledge 
(expert) 
Coordinator / 
minder hybrid with 
a slight expert 
touch 
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The average Belgian adviser appears to be highly educated with previous public sector experience, 
yet s/he is a generalist in that the usually assigned portfolios on which s/he works do not necessarily 
match the existing individual expertise. The political role of the average Belgian adviser is active 
in the minder and not the partisan sense of the word. The average Belgian adviser appears to first 
and foremost mind for issues harmful to the political executive, working more like a bodyguard 
rather than a party apparatchik indulging into the politics of political dominance. The average 
Belgian adviser communicates both in technical/managerial and political terms. More importantly 
the policy role of the average Belgian adviser reflects that of a fixer who mends and monitors 
policy, while the impact of his/her work is primarily management followed by mutuality, that is a 
synthesis of coordination and protection of the political executive from harm. Based on the data in 
hand, the average profile of the Belgian ministerial cabinet adviser is that of a hybrid of the 
coordinator and minder types.    
The average Greek ministerial cabinet adviser appears also to be a highly educated generalist. 
However, unlike the Belgian case, the average adviser in Greece portrays a rather variable political 
role. While politically alert, s/he comes up as rather passive when it comes to overt political 
activities, especially partisan ones. Her/his communication role is both technical/managerial and 
political. In terms of policy making s/he is a pure fixer whose impact is management. The Greek 
adviser in our sample appears to fit quite clearly in Connaughton’s coordinator type.    
Finally, the average European Commission cabinet adviser too appears to be a highly educated 
generalist, though with significant previous experience from the EC institutions. Much like in 
Belgium, the average EC cabinet adviser has a highly active political role, which is more of the 
bodyguard (protection of the Commissioner from harm), rather than of the ‘party apparatchik’ 
kind. As with both Greece and Belgium, the EC cabinet adviser communicates both in 
technical/managerial and political terms. In relation to the policy role the average EC cabinet 
adviser is also predominantly a fixer. Her/his impact though goes beyond management, to 
mutuality (protecting the Commissioner) and to a certain extent knowledge. In this respect, it may 
be argued that the average EC cabinet adviser type comes up as a hybrid of the coordinator type 
with that of the minder, with a light shade of the expert type.    
How useful is this aggregation into average adviser profiles? Do we get different results if we are 
to treat data on the individual level? Instead of asking what is the average adviser profile, why not 
count how many advisers of which type are to be found in every ministerial cabinet system?  The 
data on Belgium show that despite the greater precision we get through this route, the general 
picture remains largely the same (table 17). 
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Table 17: Roles per individual Belgian Adviser 
Role according to typology of Connaughton 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Expert 2 5,0 5,9 5,9 
Partisan 1 2,5 2,9 8,8 
Coordinator 13 32,5 38,2 47,1 
Minder 3 7,5 8,8 55,9 
Coordinator and Minder 4 10,0 11,8 67,6 
Expert and Minder 2 5,0 5,9 73,5 
Minder and Partisan 1 2,5 2,9 76,5 
Coordinator and Expert 3 7,5 8,8 85,3 
Coordinator and Partisan 1 2,5 2,9 88,2 
Minder, Coordinator and Partisan 1 2,5 2,9 91,2 
Expert, Coordinator and Partisan 1 2,5 2,9 94,1 
politically active Expert and Minder 1 2,5 2,9 97,1 
Minder with emphasis on policy technicalities 1 2,5 2,9 100,0 
Total 34 85,0 100,0  
Missing Missing value 6 15,0   
Total 40 100,0   
 
In a group of 40 respondents, of which 6 were excluded due to missing data in certain questions, 
13 Belgian advisers fall within the clear coordinator type, 3 are pure minders and 4 are both 
coordinator and minders.  This is already 20 advisers, which makes up 58,8% of our valid percent. 
Moreover, as we observe in table 17, both the coordinator and the minder type continues to come 
up in various combinations with other types in another six respondents, raising the percentage at 
an even higher level.  
In view of the above results, the hypothesis according to which ministerial cabinet systems 
comprise of different types of advisers is confirmed.  
This is further corroborated by interviews with EC members of cabinet. As a Deputy Chief of 
Cabinet stated: 
I think we have a good mix of technical expertise, political knowledge of the home country and 
managerial qualifications. A good cabinet needs to serve all these roles, as it is important to 
deliver on all the aspects. [Own translation] 
However, it is also clear from the data in hand that in ministerial cabinet systems there emerges a 
dominant type of adviser. The average adviser appears to be that of the coordinator on its pure or 
variant hybrid forms, the most important of which in the systems under consideration is a synthesis 
with the minder type. In this respect the hypothesis that there is no dominant adviser type is 
disconfirmed.    
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5. Working across three arenas: responsibility or opportunity? 
We now move on to examine the arenas in which advisers’ policy work is more pronounced. The 
question here is the following: which arena(s) constitutes the core part of their work and which 
represents more of an opportunity than responsibility? Working with the department (1st arena), 
working within the executive (2nd arena) or working with stakeholders (3rd arena) (Maley 2015)? 
In order to understand this we asked advisers to point and rank what they consider to be their three 
primary job functions. Additionally, we asked them to state the frequency of time spent in certain 
broad activities and more specific tasks. We triangulated the above data with material from 
interviews. 
In table 18 we can see that Belgian advisers work intensively on all three arenas.  
Table 18: Working across three arenas. Belgian advisers 
Arena Top 3 primary 
functions 
Frequency of 
Activities (once a 
week & daily) 
 
Frequency of 
Tasks 
(once a week & 
daily) 
 
Opportunity or 
Responsibility? 
Vertical 
Coordination: 
working with 
the department 
 
Liaising with 
other parts of the 
department 
(23,5%) 
Coordination and 
management (of 
policy work, the 
cabinet staff, civil 
servants) (29,4%) 
Attend meetings 
with federal civil 
servants (58,8%)  
Responsibility 
Intra-
executive 
Coordination: 
working 
within other 
political 
executives 
 
  Meet advisers from 
other ministerial 
cabinets (85,29%) 
Meet with other 
federal institutions 
officials to 
coordinate policy   
(38,2%) 
Responsibility 
Horizontal 
Governance 
Coordination: 
working with 
stakeholders 
Coordinating 
relations with 
stakeholders 
(50%) 
 Broker meetings 
with interest groups 
(50%) 
Responsibility 
 
In relation to the first two arenas this should not come up as a surprise. Work with the 
administration is to be expected. Belgian adviser 40 has summarized the whole process 
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The most important thing you had to do was to prepare legislative and executive texts. 
Consulting/debating/negotiating with the other parties and present these in the council of ministers 
for first and second reading and if necessary let them be approved in the parliament. That is 
actually your task … [first] You have to negotiate/communicate with the administration: "how are 
we going to execute this part of the government agreement, do we have to study thing about it, do 
we get it well enough what we want to do?". Okay, then we make a design. [Own translation] 
The consociational and consensus nature of Belgian democracy, on the centre of which lies 
coalition government politics, requires intensive coordination and heavy political and policy work 
not only within the department, but also across the coalition government parties. As Belgian 
adviser 40 stated 
Once you have a design of a legislative text then you will negotiate with the vice-prime ministers 
of all political parties plus the cabinet-premier: and there you discuss the text. From A till Z and 
back, so if you achieve something then you go to the council of minister for first reading and then 
to Council of State (raad van state) for a second reading. That is the most essential of your tasks, 
and everything else you do depends on this.[Own translation] 
Finally, the moderately strong corporatist nature of interest intermediation in Belgium means that 
a coordinated, cooperative institutionalised system of policy making is in place. This in term means 
that advisers work with stakeholders as part of their core work. It is for them a responsibility rather 
than an opportunity. As Belgian adviser 40 stated:  
So if you meet stakeholder, or the sector, or other organisations. If you have an informal 
negotiation, or one with the research centre of your party: no matter what those are, all serve to 
inform you to the maximum, such that your text would carry as much consensus as possible and 
would be as good as possible in executive terms. [Own translation] 
In contrast to the average Belgian adviser, the average Greek adviser of our sample appears to be 
more fully focused on working within the department and across the executive, mainly with peers 
(table 19). This is a responsibility. Working with stakeholders appears as more of an opportunity, 
which one out of three Greek advisers do nevertheless appear to take up. It may be argued that this 
reflects the broader Greek setting where the Political Offices of the Minister form part of a core 
executive government that has been described as fragmented and suffering from a “deep rooted 
problem of coordination” (Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2013, pp. 524, 525). Advisers and 
cabinets do appear as a first solution to this problem. Beyond this, though, the majoritarian and 
winner takes all nature of Greek electoral and executive politics does not constitute working with 
stakeholders a necessity, but rather an opportunity which can be grabbed by advisers and their 
political executives on an ad hoc basis.   
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Table 19: Coordinating across three arenas. Greek advisers 
Arena Top 3 primary 
functions 
Frequency of 
Activities (once a 
week & daily) 
 
Frequency of 
Tasks 
(once a week & 
daily) 
 
Opportunity or 
Responsibility? 
Vertical 
Coordination: 
working with 
the department 
 
 Coordination and 
management (of 
policy work, the 
cabinet staff, civil 
servants) (71,4%) 
Meet with 
departmental 
officials (78,57%) 
Responsibility 
Intra-
executive 
Coordination: 
working 
within other 
political 
executives 
 
  Meet advisers from 
other ministerial 
cabinets (75%) 
Responsibility 
Horizontal 
Governance 
Coordination: 
working with 
stakeholders 
Coordinating 
relations with 
stakeholders  
(32,1%) 
 Broker meetings 
with interest groups 
(28,57%) 
Opportunity 
 
Finally, as is the case in Belgium, but contrary to Greece, the work of the average EC cabinet 
adviser is a responsibility across all three arenas (table 20). Working within the department is a 
core responsibility. As EC adviser 1 stated 
[…] we are in daily contact with the Directors-General and the Directors. […] In practice, 
cabinets can impose certain positions to the services, encourage the initiation of a policy draft or 
express their disapproval of the scope of a given proposal. This is day-to-day business for us. 
[Own translation] 
Coordinating across the Commission is also a core responsibility of advisers’ work. The interview 
with an EC Policy Assistant corroborated this 
“There are regular meetings among advisers and every Monday the chefs de cabinet meet in order 
to prepare the meeting of the College of Commissioners that takes place every Wednesday”  [Own 
translation] 
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The Commissioners’ agenda is always considered at a weekly meeting of the heads of the 
Commissioners’ cabinets” while “feeding into chefs de cabinet meetings are the outcomes of 
meetings between the cabinet members responsible for particular policy areas” (Nugent 2010, p. 
120).  
Table 20: Coordinating across three arenas. EC 
Arena Top 3 primary 
functions 
Frequency of 
Activities (once a 
week & daily) 
 
Frequency of 
Tasks 
(once a week & 
daily) 
 
Opportunity or 
Responsibility? 
Vertical 
Coordination: 
working with 
the department 
 
Liaising with the 
Commission 9 
(56,25%) 
Coordination and 
Management of 
policy work, the 
Cabinet Staff, 
Civil Servants 15 
(93,75%) 
Attend meetings 
with European 
Commission’s DG 
Civil Servants to 
discuss the nuts and 
bolts of policy 12 
(75%) 
Responsibility 
Intra-
executive 
Coordination: 
working 
within other 
political 
executives 
 
  Meet advisers from 
other EC cabinets 
13 (81,25%) 
Responsibility 
Horizontal 
Governance 
Coordination: 
working with 
stakeholders 
Coordinating 
with 
stakeholders 4 
(25%)  
 Broker meetings 
with interest groups 
8 (50%) 
Responsibility 
 
Finally, working with stakeholders is also an advisers’ core work responsibility. As EC adviser 3 
stated 
“Our cabinet interacts with a wide range of actors. We usually get a huge amount of requests to 
meet with stakeholders, to deliver speeches on behalf of the Commissioner, to represent him/her 
in a political context in the EP, at workshop level with MEPs etc. I think it is one of the prime tasks 
and this is why cabinets should be composed of people who are able to perform in public.” 
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But how can working with stakeholders as an institutional responsibility be explained? According 
to Gouglas et al (2014) this can be explained by the nature of lobbying, the logic of granting access 
to interest groups and the pattern of interest representation at the EU level. To begin with, interest 
groups and stakeholders seek to gain access to and influence the main EU institutions: the 
European Commission, the Council of Ministers and increasingly the European Parliament. 
Traditionally, the European Commission, and particularly lower civil servants who undertake most 
of the policy preparatory work at an early stage and have technical know-how, have been the main 
focus of lobbying activities. However, the Commissioner, the cabinet and high civil servants are 
also the targets of ad hoc high level lobbying. Lobbying, though, is not a unidirectional activity of 
interest groups versus the EU institutions, but it can be better seen as the exchange of resources 
between interdependent organizations. Interest groups seek access and influence, but EU 
institutions also want to interact with stakeholders, having as their goal the acquisition of 
information and knowledge, as well as building of support and legitimacy for the proposed policy. 
This is the logic of access described by Bouwen (2002, 2004, 2009). Finally, it may be argued that 
this logic of access is interlinked to an EU system of interest representation, which with the 
exception of social policy, can be better described as either neo-pluralist or elite pluralist (Hix, 
2005, Coen 1997). In relation to the former, unlike corporatism, there is no privileged access of 
certain groups, but officials activate the relevant interest(s) in a specific policy issue. This happens 
through financial support or the use of informal rules and guidelines, such as the recent European 
Transparency Initiative. In relation to elite pluralism, interest groups and stakeholders are activated 
through committees and small expert groups (committee governance), hearings or roundtables, 
and institutionalised consultation fora (forum politics). 
 
6. Discussion / Conclusion  
In the present study we examined ministerial cabinet system advisers in Belgium, Greece and the 
European Commission. We collected data from three different research studies. All three studies 
used a mixed data collection methods approach: a questionnaire survey was followed by interviews 
in order to triangulate our data and get a deeper look at it. The survey questions were identical, but 
not exactly the same. Some change had to happen in order to accommodate the specificities of the 
EC as a supranational organisation. Moreover, the sampling technique between the Greek survey 
and the ones on Belgium and the EC differ.  In the Greek case the researcher used purposeful 
sampling, focusing on two ministerial cabinet systems of the same ministry run by two ministers 
coming from different political parties at a specific time during the economic crisis. The EC and 
Belgian survey was distributed to the whole population of advisers towards the end of the 
Commission’s and the Belgian government’s mandate respectively. The EC survey received a very 
low response rate due to the fact that it was distributed just before the European Parliament election 
time. The survey is currently being repeated. The survey on Belgium did not face such a problem 
as it was conducted after elections on advisers of the previous government. Finally, at a more 
conceptual level, some answers to survey questions are used as data to different concepts. This is 
the case in regards to using the answers on primary job functions and frequency of broad policy 
activities in order to draw conclusions regarding advisers’ work at the three arenas. For instance 
coordination and management of the departmental staff has both a substantive (nature of task) and 
dimensional (arena) side to it. While this practice can be methodologically checked, it may be 
argued that if substance and dimension is discerned carefully by the researcher during the analysis 
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of results it should not be a huge problem. Overall, given the challenges of the present 
methodological approach we need to highlight that there are limitations to the present study and 
that findings need to be interpreted under this light.  
Having said this, we should not underestimate the findings in hand either. Overall we have data on 
84 ministerial cabinet advisers in three ministerial cabinet systems: a historical one, Belgium, a 
more recent one Greece, and a consolidated but at the supranational level, the European 
Commission. This allows us to make some claims based on an adequately representative sample.  
In relation to the policy cycle hypothesis it is largely confirmed that ministerial cabinet advisers 
do colonise all stages of the policy cycle. However, the frequency of time spent in every stage 
differs from system to system, resulting into three different hourglass shapes. In the case of Greece 
we get a more balanced policy hourglass with two big glass bulbs (front end and back end of the 
cycle) joined by a thinner neck (decision making). In the Belgian and EC cases it is the policy 
evaluation and monitoring stage that comes up as less pronounced.  
In relation to adviser types, the hypothesis according to which there is no dominant adviser type, 
but a multitude of roles contingent upon system, policy sector and political executive is partly 
confirmed. Indeed we do find a multitude of roles in every cabinet, however there does also emerge 
a dominant adviser type. Which one? The hypothesis of the expert type is here disconfirmed. So 
is that of the partisan. The average ministerial cabinet adviser seems to be highly educated, at times 
with important previous experience in the public sector, the cabinet or the world of policy work, 
who rarely works on the portfolio of his/her expertise. S/he is primarily a fixer who mends and 
monitors policy, his/her impact being management, acting also as the minister’s body guard, a 
minder protecting the political executive from potential harm. In layman’s terms the average 
ministerial cabinet system adviser appears to be a political policy manager.  
Finally, in relation to advisers’ dimension of work, the three arenas hypotheses are largely 
confirmed. Working within the ministry and across the executive constitutes part of the core work 
of the average ministerial cabinet system adviser. In terms of the latter we find elements of 
command and control top down management, especially in the Belgian and Greek cases. In relation 
to the latter the average adviser facilitates inter-executive coordination, be it in coalition 
government systems like the Belgian one, or in fragmented core executive systems like the Greek 
and European Commission ones. Where things differ is in relation to work with stakeholders. 
Whether working along with interest groups and societal actors comes up as an institutionally 
embedded responsibility, or alternatively, as an opportunity to be grabbed by individual actors on 
an ad hoc basis, seems to depend on the nature of executive government and the pattern of interest 
intermediation. In Greek majoritarian politics and weak corporatist culture, advisers spend much 
less time in working with stakeholders. In Belgian consociational democracy, consensus 
government and higher levels of corporatism, working with stakeholders seems to be a 
responsibility. Finally, in the European Commission neo-pluralist system of interest intermediation 
where the EU institutions actively engage and activate interest groups, providing access in the EU 
in exchange for knowledge and greater legitimacy, working with stakeholders is also a 
responsibility.       
To conclude, it may be argued that the study of advisers in the Belgian, Greek and European 
Commission cabinet systems has in some way limited the empirical gap in relation to advisers and 
policy making in ministerial cabinet systems. Future research could modify/refine the study (make 
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it more cohesive), repeat it again or expand it to other ministerial cabinet systems like the French, 
the Italian and the Portuguese ones. An insightful addition to the policy cycle, Connaughton’s 
types (2010a,2010b, 2015) and Maley’s (2015) arenas, would be to examine ministerial cabinet 
advisers as core executive policy coordinators, using Craft’s (2015) approach. Moreover, it may 
be argued that at some point a more systematic comparison would also have to be made with non-
ministerial cabinet systems. Are advisers in those systems so totally distinct to their peers in 
ministerial cabinet systems? Or are we observing a process of ‘cabinetisation’, affecting not only 
the organisation of advisory work, but also the substance of the core work of political advisers? 
The refinement of the ‘cabinetisation’ concept, a first rough definition of which we sketched in the 
introduction, along with the implementation of internationally comparative empirical work on 
ministerial cabinet and non-cabinet systems, can be a useful future contribution to both the 
ministerial cabinet literature, as well as to the next generation -second wave as Shaw and Eichbaum 
(2015) coined it- research on political advisers.    
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